[...] δικα[ιοσ]ύνη [πά]ντα ⟨τὰ⟩ τῆς πό[λεω]ς νόμιμα, [ἐν] ἧι ἂν πολι[τεύ]ηταί τις μὴ [παρ]αβαίνειν. χρῶιτ’ ἂν οὖν ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα ἑαυτῶι ξυμφ[ε]ρόντως δικαιοσύνηι, εἰ μετὰ μὲν μαρτύρων τ[ο]ὺς νόμους μεγά[λο]υς ἄγοι, μονούμενος δὲ μαρτύρων τὰ τῆς φύσεως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νόμων [ἐπίθ]ετα, τὰ δὲ [τῆς] φύσεως ἀ[ναγ]καῖα· καὶ τὰ [μὲν] τῶν νό[μω]ν ὁμολογη[θέντ]α οὐ φύν[τ’ ἐστι]ν, τὰ δὲ [τῆς] φύσεως φύν[τα οὐχ] ὁμολογη[θέντα]. τὰ οὖν νόμιμα παραβαίνων ἐὰν λάθηι τοὺς ὁμολογήσαντας καὶ αἰσχύνης καὶ ζημίας ἀπήλλακται· μὴ λαθὼν δ’ οὔ· τῶν δὲ τῆι φύσει ξυμφύτων ἐάν τι παρὰ τὸ δυνατὸν βιάζηται, ἐάν τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους λάθηι, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον τὸ κακόν, ἐάν τε πάντες ἴδωσιν, οὐδὲν μεῖζον· οὐ γὰρ διὰ δόξαν βλάπτεται, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀλήθειαν. ἔστι δὲ πάντων ἕνεκα τούτων ἡ σκέψις, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολεμίως τῆι φύσ[ει] κεῖται· νενο[μο]θ[έ]τηται γὰρ [ἐ]πί τε τοῖς ὀφ[θ]αλμοῖς ἃ δεῖ αὐτο[ὺ]ς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἃ οὐ [δε]ῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν ἃ δεῖ αὐτὰ ἀκούειν καὶ ἃ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆι γλώττηι ἅ τ[ε] δεῖ αὐτὴν λέγειν καὶ ἃ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς χερσὶν ἅ τε δεῖ αὐτὰς δρᾶν καὶ ἃ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ποσὶν ἐφ’ ἅ τε δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἰέναι καὶ ἐφ’ ἃ οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶι νῶι ὧν τε δεῖ αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ὧν μή.
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κα[ὶ οἵτινε]ς ἂν πα[θόν]τες ἀμύνων[ται κ]αὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ [ἄρχ]ωσι τοῦ δρᾶν, [καὶ ο]ἵτινε[ς] ἂν [τοὺς] γειναμέ[νου]ς καὶ κακοὺς ὄντας εἰς αὐτοὺς εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ οἱ κατόμνυσθαι διδόντες ἑτέροις αὐτοὶ δὲ μὴ κατομνύμε[νοι]. καὶ τούτων τῶν εἰρημένων πολλὰ ἄν τις εὕροι πολέμια τῆι φύσει· ἔνι τ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλγύνεσθαί τε μᾶλλον ἐξὸν ἥττω, καὶ ἐλάττω ἥδεσθαι ἐξὸν πλείω, καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐξὸν μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τις [τ]οῖς τοιαῦτα προσ[ι]εμένοις ἐπικού[ρ]ησις ἐγίγνε[το] παρὰ τῶν νό[μ]ων, τοῖς δὲ μὴ [π]ροσιεμένοις ἀλ[λ’ ἐν]αντιουμέ[ν]οις ἐλάττωσις, οὐκ ἀν[ωφελὲς ἂν] ἦν τ[οῖς νόμοις πεί]θεσθαι. νῦν δὲ φαίνε[ται τοῖς] προσιε[μένοις] τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐ[κ] νόμου δικαί[ον] οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἐπικουρεῖν· ὅ γε πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιτρέπει τῶι πάσχοντι παθεῖν καὶ τῶι δρῶντι δρᾶσαι· καὶ οὔτε ἐνταῦθα διεκώλυε τὸν πάσχοντα μὴ παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸν δρῶντα δρᾶσαι· εἴς τε τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναφερόμενον οὐδὲν ἰδιώτερον ἐπὶ [τ]ῶι [π]επονθότι ἢ τῶι δεδρακό[τι].
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[...]ρων ἐπ[αιδούμε]θά τε κ[αὶ σεβόμεθα], τοὺς δὲ [ἐκ φαύ]λου οἴκ[ου ὄντας] οὔτε ἐπ[αιδούμε]θα οὔτε σεβόμ[εθα]· ἐν τ[ο]ύτω[ι γὰρ] πρὸς ἀλλή[λους] βεβαρβαρώ[με]θα, ἐπεὶ φύσει πάντα πάντ[ες] ὁμοίως πεφύκ[α]μεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλλην[ες] εἶναι. σκοπεῖν [δὲ] παρέχει τὰ τῶν φύσει [ὄντων] ἀναγκαί[ων] πᾶσιν ἀν[θρώ]ποις· [...] οὔτε β[άρβα]ρος ἀφώρι[σται] ἡμῶν ο[ὐδεὶς] οὔτε Ἕλλην· ἀναπνέομέν τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀέρ[α] ἅπαντες κατὰ τὸ στόμ[α κ]αὶ κατ[ὰ] τὰς ῥῖνας [...]
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[...] τοῦ δικαίου [σπουδ]αίου δοκοῦν[τος τὸ] μαρτυρεῖν [ἐν ἀλ]λήλοις τἀληθῆ [δίκαιο]ν νομίζεται [εἶναι] καὶ χρήσιμον [οὐδὲν] ἧττον εἰς [τὰ τῶν] ἀνθρώπων [ἐπιτ]ηδεύματα. [τοῦτο] τοίνυν οὐ δί[καιος] ἔσται ὁ ποιῶν. [καὶ γὰ]ρ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν [μηδ]ένα μὴ ἀδι[κού]μενον αὐτὸν [δίκ]αιόν ἐστιν· ἀνάγ[κη] γὰρ τὸν μαρτυ[ροῦ]ντα κἂν ἀλη[θῆ μ]αρτυρῆι ὅμως [ἄλλον] πως ἀδικεῖν· [εἰκὸς δὲ?] αὐτὸν ἀ[δι]κεῖσθαι [εἰς ὕστερο]ν· ἔνε[στί γε ἐ]ν ὧι διὰ τ[ὰ ὑπ’ ἐκείν]ου μαρτ[υρηθέν]τα ἁλίσκ[ε]ται ὁ καταμαρτυρούμενος καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν ἢ χρήματα ἢ αὐτὸν [δ]ιὰ τοῦτον ὃν οὐδὲν [ἀ]δικεῖ· ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτωι τὸν κατα[μ]αρτυρούμενον [ἀ]δικεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἀδι[κο]ῦντα ἑαυτὸν ἀ[δι]κεῖ· αὐτὸς δ’ ἀδικεῖ[ται ὑ]πὸ τοῦ καταμαρ[τυρηθ]έντος ὅτι μι[σεῖται] ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ [ἀ]ληθῆ μαρτυρ[ή]σας· καὶ οὐ μόν[ον] τῶι μίσει ἀλλὰ κ[αὶ] ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν τὸ[ν] αἰῶνα πάντα φυλάττεσθαι τοῦτο[ν] οὗ κατεμαρτύρ[η]σεν· ὡς ὑπάρχε[ι] γ’ αὐτῶι ἐχθρὸς τοιο[ῦ]τος οἷος καὶ λέγειν καὶ δρᾶν εἴ τι δύν[αι]το κακὸν αὐτόν. κα[ί]τοι ταῦτα φαίνεται οὐ σμικρὰ ὄντα τἀδικήματα· οὔτε ἃ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖται οὔτε ἃ ἀδικεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταῦτά τε δίκαια εἶναι καὶ τὸ μη[δ]ὲν ἀδικεῖν μη[δὲ] αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖσθαι· [ἀλλ]’ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν [ἢ] τὰ ἕτερα αὐτῶν [δ]ίκαια εἶναι ἢ ἀμφότερα ἄδικα· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ δικάζειν καὶ τὸ κρίνειν καὶ τὸ διαιτᾶν ὅπως ἂν περαίνηται οὐ [δ]ίκαια ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ [ἄ]λλους ὠφελοῦν ἄλ[λο]υς βλάπτει· ἐν δὲ [τού]τωι οἱ μὲν ὠφελού[μενο]ι οὐκ ἀδικοῦ[νται οἱ] δὲ βλαπτόμε[νοι ...]
. . . justice consists in not transgressing any of the ordinances of the state of which one is a citizen. A man would therefore exercise justice with most advantage to himself if in the presence of witnesses he held in esteem the laws, but in the absence of witnesses, the precepts of nature. For the precepts of the laws are adventitious, whereas those of nature are necessary, and the precepts of the laws are the product of agreement, not of growth, while those of nature are the product of growth, not of agreement. Thus in transgressing legal ordinances, whenever he is unobserved by the parties to the agreement, he is free both from shame and punishment, but not if he is observed. On the other hand, if he strain any of the innate principles of nature more than it can bear, the evil is no less, if he is unobserved by every one, nor any greater, if every one sees. For the injury does not depend on opinion but on fact. All this is the object of our inquiry; because most of what is just according to law stands in opposition to nature. The law has laid down for the eyes what they ought to see and what they ought not, for the ears what they ought to hear and what they ought not, for the tongue what it ought to say and what it ought not, for the hands what they ought to do and what they ought not, for the feet whither they ought to go and whither they ought not, and for the mind what it ought to desire and what not.
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and who repel attack but do not themselves begin the aggression, and who are kind to their parents even when these behave badly to them, and who permit others to affirm on oath but do not do so themselves. Much of what has been mentioned would be found to be in opposition to nature; there is involved in it greater pain when less is possible, or less pleasure when more is possible, or injury when injury might be avoided. Now if those who adopted such courses as these had any protection from the laws, whereas those who did not adopt them but opposed them incurred loss, obedience to the laws would not be without advantage; but as it is, legal justice is found inadequate to protect those who adopt them. First of all it allows the injury of the injured and the aggression of the aggressor, and besides not originally preventing the injured from being injured, nor the aggressor from making aggression, on being held over until punishment is inflicted, it is no more favourable to the injured than to the aggressor.
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We revere and venerate [the great], but the lowly-born we do not revere or venerate; for in this our conduct to each other is barbarized, since we are all by nature alike fully adapted to be either barbarians or Hellenes. We may see this from the needs which all men naturally have; in . . . no one is marked off as barbarian or Hellene. We all breathe the air with mouth and nostrils . . .
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. . . justice is regarded as virtuous and at the same time to testify to the truth concerning one another is considered just and equally useful for human pursuits. The man who does so however is not just. For it is just to wrong no one when one is not oneself wronged; and he who gives testimony, even if it is true, cannot help to some extent doing a wrong; and there is a probability that he may himself subsequently be wronged: this is at any rate possible, in so far as the man against whom he testifies is convicted in consequence of his testimony, and loses either money or life owing to a person whom he is in no way wronging. Herein therefore he wrongs the man against whom testimony is given, that he wrongs some one who is not wronging him; and he is himself wronged by such a person, because he is hated by him although he testified to the truth, and wronged not by his hatred only but also because he must always be on his guard against this man against whom he testified, regarding him as an enemy prepared to do what damage he can, either in word or deed. These wrongs do not seem inconsiderable, either those received or those inflicted. For it is not possible that these acts should be just and that not to do or receive a wrong should also be just, but either one of them must be just or both must be unjust. Condemnation, judgement, and arbitration, whatever their upshot, are therefore seen not to be just; for what benefits some injures others; and in this those who are benefitted are not wronged, but those who are injured . . .
Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt · The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XI (1915), pp. 101–103, and Part XV (1922), p. 121